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Moving from Preparation to Perpetration? 
Atempted Crimes and Breach 
of the Peace in Scots Law 
 
 
Pamela R. Ferguson* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a recent issue of this journal, Professor Robert Batey posed a hypothetical 
problem based  on a scene in  Saul  Below’s Herzog, in  which the eponymous 
character  decides to  kil  his ex-wife and  her lover.1  The scenario concerned 
Herzog’s liability to  be  prosecuted for, inter alia, atempted  murder.  This  paper 
considers the problem from the perspective of Scotish criminal law, and concludes 
that while the Scotish requirements for atempted crimes are more stringent than 
those required by the American Model Penal Code [MPC], the former does have 
an alternative crime, namely “breach of the peace.”  This crime has been used to 
circumvent the problem of where to draw the line between preparing to commit a 
crime and actualy atempting to commit that crime. This paper considers whether 
breach of the peace could, and also whether it should, be prosecuted instead of a 
crime of atempt. 
 
I. THE SCENARIO 
 
In Batey’s hypothetical, Herzog travels to the  home  of  his ex-wife,  having 
first  obtained a loaded  gun.  He  hides in bushes  near the  house and  watches  his 
former spouse and  her  new lover.  Herzog  had intended to  kil the couple  but 
changes  his  mind.  However,  he is arested the folowing  day when the  gun is 
discovered on him by a police oficer.  Readers are to assume that a neighbor sees 
Herzog in the  bushes and reports this to  his ex-wife,  who  wants  him to  be 
prosecuted.2  Professors Michael Cahil, Wiliam Pizzi, John Hasnas, and Gideon 
Yaffe each took up the chalenge of responding to this scenario. Although Batey 
suggested several questions that might be considered to arise in this scenario, the 
central focus here, as in the papers of the four commentators, wil be on the actus 
reus of atempted murder.  
 
                                                                          
*  Professor of Scots Law, University of Dundee, Scotland. I am grateful to Robin White for 
helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1  Robert Batey, Atempt and Reckless Endangerment in Saul Below’s Herzog, 9 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 749, 749–50 (2012). 
2  Id. at 749–50. 
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I. ATTEMPTS IN THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
 
The  MPC defines the actus reus of atempts as anything that constitutes a 
“substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of 
the crime,” and specifies a list of behavior which, if it “strongly corroborates” the 
actor’s criminal purpose, could be held to be suficient (or, in the wording of the 
section, “shal  not be  held insufficient as a  mater  of law”) to constitute an 
atempt.3 These include lying in wait; searching for or folowing the contemplated 
victim of the crime; enticing or seeking to entice the intended victim to go to the 
place contemplated for the crime’s commission; reconnoitering or unlawfully 
entering a structure, vehicle, or enclosure in which the crime is to be commited; 
and possessing materials to be used in the crime.4  
Analyzing the scenario, Cahil doubts whether Herzog’s behavior is “strongly 
corroborative” of an intention to kil, since he was driven to spy on the house from 
a variety of complex reasons.5 This is an issue of suficiency of evidence; in order 
to focus on the actus reus of atempted murder, we need to assume that there was 
adequate evidence of mens rea (perhaps Herzog tels the police officer “I came to 
Chicago to kil them both”). Cahil accepts that Herzog’s conduct corresponds to 
“lying in wait” or “reconnoitering” the scene, and thus is suficient to constitute a 
substantial step that amounts to the actus reus of atempted murder. However, he 
concludes that  prosecution  would  be  unwise  due to the likelihood  of Herzog 
establishing the abandonment defense provided by the MPC,6 since he changed his 
mind about  kiling the couple.  Pizzi likewise concludes that there  would  be 
enough “to take this case to the jury”7 for atempted murder, but he too ultimately 
concludes that conviction for atempted murder is unlikely due to abandonment. 
In respect of whether a prosecutor could properly charge atempted murder in 
these circumstances,  Hasnas states, “the answer  would clearly  be ‘yes.’”8 He 
points out, however, that the actual question posed by Batey is not whether Herzog 
could,  but rather  whether  he should,  be so charged,9 and argues that  he should 
not—on the ground that, in his view, the MPC recognizes atempted crimes at too 
early a stage.10  Yaffe also concludes that “[Herzog]  has atempted  murder” but 
                                                                          
3   MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), (2) (1985). 
4  Id. at § 5.01(2). 
5  Michael T. Cahil, Defining Inchoate Crime: An Incomplete Attempt, 9 OHIO ST.  J. CRIM. 
L. 751, 752 (2012).  
6   MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1985).  
7  Wiliam T. Pizzi, Rethinking Atempt Under the Model Penal Code, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 
771, 772–73 (2012).  
8  John  Hasnas, Atempt,  Preparation,  and  Harm:  The  Case  of the Jealous  Ex-Husband, 9 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 761, 761 (2012).  
9  Batey, supra note 1, at 749 (posing the question: “Should the local prosecutor charge him 
for [the] atempted murder . . . ?”). 
10   Id. 
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argues that the subsequent abandonment should lead to a reduced sentence.11 
Thus, while their  views  differ as to  whether abandonment  ought to  provide a 
complete defense, and some favor an alternative approach to atempts from that 
taken by the MPC, none of the commentators doubts that, as a mater of strict law, 
Herzog has commited atempted murder. This conclusion comes as a surprise to 
the Scotish reader.  There is litle doubt that Herzog could not be prosecuted for 
atempted murder had Below’s scenario been set in Scotland. 
 
II. SCOTTISH LAW 
 
The mens rea for atempted crimes in Scots law is generaly the same as for 
completed crimes, insofar as  only crimes  of intent can  be atempted.12  It is  of 
course  very  difficult to  know  what a  person intended,  particularly  where that 
intention  did  not come to fruition.  In respect  of the actus reus, the law 
distinguishes between acts which constitute atempts to commit a crime, and acts 
which are regarded as merely preparatory to such an atempt, since generaly only 
the former atract criminal liability.13 In order to constitute a criminal atempt, the 
accused must be actualy perpetrating the crime.  Where the line should be drawn 
between mere preparation and actual perpetration is treated as a mater of fact, and 
is thus for the trial judge (in summary cases)  or the jury (in cases  prosecuted on 
indictment under solemn  procedure) to  determine.  It is  unclear  whether the 
abandonment defense is recognized in  Scots law;  while the leading  work argues 
that it would be unjust if the law did not take account of an accused’s change of 
heart, there is no authority on the point.14 
The leading Scotish case  of atempt liability is H.  M. Advocate v. 
Camerons,15 decided in  1911, in which the accused were spouses who  were 
prosecuted for atempting to  defraud an insurance company.  Cecil and  Ruby 
Cameron staged a fake robbery and reported the theft to their insurance broker, but 
the prosecution failed to establish that they had made a claim against the insurance 
company itself.  The trial judge,  Lord Justice-General  Dunedin, directed the jury 
that what  was at issue  was the  need to  determine “where  preparation ends and 
perpetration  begins.  In  other  words, it is a  question  of  degree, and  when it is a 
                                                                          
11 Gideon Yafe, Atempt, Risk-Creation, and Change of Mind: Reflections on Herzog, 9 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 779, 779–87 (2012).   
12 Cawthorne v. H. M. Advocate, (1968) J.C. 32 (Scot.); see also 1 GERALD H. GORDON, THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND 6.67 (Michael G.A. Christie ed., 2000).  
13 An exception is the crime  of conspiracy  which is commited as soon as the  protagonists 
agree to commit a crime.  Preparations  need  have  progressed  no further than the  bare agreement. 
Conspiracy requires at least two people to form such an agreement, thus it has no application to the 
Herzog scenario.  Id. 
14 Id. at 6.30. 
15 H. M. Advocate v. Camerons, (1911) S.C. (J.) 110 (Scot.). 
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question of degree it is a jury question.”16 The couple were convicted of atempted 
fraud. In Docherty v. Brown17 the appeal court reiterated: 
 
[F]or a relevant charge  of an atempt to commit a crime, it  must  be 
averred that the accused has the necessary mens rea, and that he has done 
some positive act towards executing his purpose, that is to say that he has 
done something  which amounts to perpetration rather than  mere 
preparation.18 
 
A similar test was employed in Ford v. H. M. Advocate,19 in which the appeal 
court stated the requirements for atempted rape as being that the accused had the 
intention of having sexual intercourse with the complainer (i.e. the aleged victim) 
forcibly and against her wil (which was the common law definition of rape),20 and 
that  he “engaged in conduct  which  passed from the stage  of  preparation [for the 
crime] into the stage of perpetration of the crime.”21 
A slightly  different and statutory example is  provided  by the Criminal  Law 
(Consolidation) (Scotland)  Act  1995 which  makes it an offense to “atempt[] to 
enter” a sports  ground  while  drunk.22  What constitutes such an atempt  was at 
issue in the case of Barret v. Alan.23 The police observed the accused, who was 
drunk, as  he stood in the queue at a turnstile entrance to a footbal stadium.  He 
was  warned  not to enter, and he then turned away.  However,  he returned a few 
minutes later and re-joined the queue. When he was some eighty to one hundred 
yards and around the corner from the turnstile,24 he was arested, at which point he 
stated, “I’m no [i.e. not] that  drunk. I’m  going in.”  This established that  his 
intention was to enter the grounds, but did his behavior constitute the actus reus of 
                                                                          
16 Id. at 114.  The Lord Justice-General is Scotland’s most senior criminal judicial post. 
17 Docherty v. Brown, (1996) J.C. 48 (Scot.).  
18 Id. at 60 (opinion of Lord Justice-Clerk Ross). The Lord Justice-Clerk is Scotland’s second 
most senior criminal judicial post. 
19 Ford v. H. M. Advocate, (2001) Scot (D) 31/10 (Scot.). 
20 Rape has since been redefined by statute as sexual intercourse without consent, rather than 
against the wil of the complainer.  See Sexual Ofences (Scotland) Act 2009, § 1.  
21 Ford, (2001) Scot (D)  31/10 at 13 (opinion  of Lord  Nimmo  Smith) (The  victim testified 
that the accused had, inter alia, placed his naked penis between her legs.). 
22  Criminal  Law (Consolidation) (Scotland)  Act  1995,  §  20(7).   At the time  of Barret v. 
Alan, (1986) S.C.C.R. 479 (Scot.), discussed below, the prohibition was contained in the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland)  Act  1980,  § 74(b): “Any  person  who . . .  while  drunk, atempts to enter, the 
relevant area  of a  designated sports  ground at any time  during the  period  of a  designated sporting 
event shal  be  guilty  of an  ofence . . . .”  This  was repealed  by the  Criminal  Procedure 
(Consequential Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1995, Sched. 5, and re-enacted, using the same wording, 
in § 20(7).  
23 Baret v. Alan, (1986) S.C.C.R. 479 (Scot.).  
24 Id. at 482 (opinion of Lord Justice-General Emslie) (finding in fact 4 of the trial judge). 
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atempting to enter the grounds?  The sheriff who heard the case at first instance 
noted in his report for the appeal court: 
 
It  would  be a crushing absurdity, and is  not seriously  otherwise 
suggested, to suppose that the appelant  was at the locus  with any 
purpose  other than, in everyday language,  going to see the  game. 
Whether or not he was atempting to enter [the footbal ground] for the 
purposes of the Act, however, is not a question necessarily resolved by 
that fact alone.25 
 
He took the  view that there  were “two limiting cases”: a  drunk  person who 
actualy reached the turnstiles and was atempting to force entry  would clearly 
contravene the legislation. At the other end of the spectrum, a Glasgwegian such 
as the appelant who  had the clear  purpose  of  going to see the footbal match in 
Edinburgh,  but who  had got  no further than the main Glasgow railway station 
some fifty miles away could not “by any stretch of the imagination[] be said to be 
atempting to enter” the  Edinburgh stadium for the  purpose of the statute.  He 
continued: 
 
It therefore seems to me that what is realy at issue is the question of how 
far a person’s general purpose of going to watch a match has crystalised, 
by  his own actings, so far and so materialy as to  bring  him within the 
ambit  of the section. If I am right in that approach, then that seems to 
lead in turn to two further questions. First, can it be said that any person 
who has . . . not actualy gained the turnstiles to the ground and who is 
atempting to pass into the ground from outside, could ever be said under 
the section to be atempting to enter the  ground? My answer to that 
question is and can  be  nothing  other than intuitive,  but is in the 
affirmative. If I be so far right, one then has to consider at what point on 
the infinite gradations between the two limiting cases to which I have 
refered did the appelant become, so to speak, a transgressor.  Again, I 
think that the answer to that question can only be intuitive and a mater 
of impression and degree. On the bases which I have outlined I thought 
that the appelant, having the purpose of entering [the stadium] and being 
part of a  queue of  persons with that common  purpose and  being some 
hundred yards from the entrance to the  ground, was a  person who had 
thereby so far actualised his general purpose as to bring him within the 
scope of the section and I convicted him accordingly.26 
                                                                          
25 Id. at  479 (Sherif  Hyslop).  Sherifs are legaly  qualified judges  who  preside  over the 
Sherif  Courts in  Scotland.  Such courts can  hear cases  under  both summary  procedure (as in this 
case, where the sherif is the trier of facts) and solemn procedure (where there is a jury of fifteen lay 
people). 
26 Id. at 479–80. 
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On appeal, counsel for the appelant argued that the facts  demonstrated that 
the appelant had conceived a firm intention of entering the sports ground, but had 
not begun to atempt to enter it.  However, the High Court of Justiciary, siting as a 
court of appeal, found that the sherif had been entitled to find that the accused’s 
acts had been “more than preparatory” and upheld the conviction.27 
Despite “preparation” and “perpetration” being refered to by the appeal court 
as “the classic terms used in identifying the ofence of atempt,”28 this distinction 
has  been criticized as  being “meaningless,” “vague,” and “unsatisfactory.”29 
Drawing the line  between preparation and  perpetration may  be  difficult,  but, as 
Barret v. Alan ilustrates, the test has  proven sufficiently flexible to alow the 
accused to  be convicted  of at least some atempted crimes  prior to the  point at 
which one might coloquialy say that they were “actualy perpetrating” the crime. 
Nevertheless, the MPC’s extended definition is much broader than that adopted in 
Scots law; a  person  who lay in  wait for or folowed his intended victim,  or who 
reconnoitered the place of the intended crime, would be unlikely to be found by a 
judge or jury to have gone far enough to be said to have moved from preparation to 
actual  perpetration.  Thus, while Professor Yaffe  points  out that under the MPC, 
“Herzog has atempted murder merely by peering in a window,”30 it is difficult to 
believe that any fact-finder would conclude that this constituted atempted murder 
in Scots law. 
Professor Hasnas cites the case of McQuirter v. State,31 in which “an African 
American was convicted of atempted assault with intent to rape for walking down 
the street behind a white woman on the basis of highly suspect evidence of what he 
was thinking.”32 This must be seen in the context of the date (1953) and the state 
(Alabama) and may be doubtful precedent for the twenty-first century even in that 
state.  There is,  however, litle  doubt that such  behavior could  not amount to an 
atempt at any offense against the person in  Scots law.  This is ilustrated by the 
case of H. M. Advocate v. Forbes.33 The indictment34 against Forbes aleged that: 
 
[Y]ou  did climb a drainpipe and break into the first floor flat there 
occupied by, inter alia [J.M.], aged  14 years, while in possession  of a 
tube of cream, and did remove your clothing with the exception of a pair 
of boxer shorts, prowl around said flat, remove articles from a chest of 
                                                                          
27 The High Court of Justiciary is Scotland’s highest domestic criminal court. 
28 Hamilton v. Vannet, (1999) G.W.D. 8-406.  
29  GORDON, supra note 12, at 6.26.  
30 Yafe, supra note 11, at 787. 
31 McQuirter v. State, 63 So. 2d 388 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953). 
32 Hasnas, supra note 8, at 766.  
33  H. M. Advocate v. Forbes, (1994) J.C. 71 (Scot.). 
34 In  Scotish solemn cases, the charges are specified  on an “indictment.” In summary 
proceedings, the charges are specified on a “complaint.” 
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drawers in a  bedroom, cut  holes in a sweatshirt and fashion it in the 
manner of a hood, al with intent to assault and rape said [J.M.].35 
 
There seems litle  doubt that such  behavior could  be  described as a 
“substantial step” in the commission of the crime of rape under the MPC; it was 
averred that the accused  had  unlawfuly entered the  building, and  was in 
possession  of  materials to  be used in commiting the crime.  Likewise, in the 
English case of R. v. Toothil,36 the accused was convicted of “atempted burglary 
with intent to rape” based on evidence that he had knocked on the door of a house, 
intending to rape the woman  who lived there.  English law employs a similar 
definition of atempted crime to that of Scots law; it is an atempt for someone to 
do an act “which is more than  merely  preparatory” to commission of the 
completed crime.37 The Court of Appeal in Toothil stated that: 
 
[T]he crucial step that this appelant took, as it seems to  us, is that  he 
knocked at the door.  By so doing, in our judgment, he moved from the 
preparatory to the executory stage of his plan.38 
 
The indictment in Forbes aleged a course of conduct which went further than 
that in Toothil: far from merely knocking on a door, Forbes was aleged to have 
broken into the flat,  undressed, and fashioned a  mask from the  victim’s own 
clothing. As with Toothil, the prosecution intended to show that his intention was 
to commit rape. By contrast with Toothil, however, the sherif in Forbes upheld a 
plea taken by the defense to the relevancy of the charge39 on the basis that there 
was no crime in Scots law of breaking into premises with intent to assault and rape. 
The Solicitor-General for Scotland, who represented the prosecution at the appeal, 
did  not atempt to  persuade the High  Court that the facts specified constituted 
atempted rape, nor did he suggest that the charge be amended to that effect.40 Had 
he atempted to do so, it is unlikely that the Court would have acceded to this. In 
Scots law, atempted rape requires an accused  person to  have actualy tried to 
achieve sexual penetration, and the indictment in Forbes narrated acts which fel 
short of this.41 The Court did, however, note: 
                                                                          
35 Forbes, (1994) J.C. 71 at 71. 
36 R. v. Toothil, [1998] C.A. (Crim) (unreported) (Eng.); but see [1998] CRIM. L. R. 876; ALL 
ENGLAND TRANSCRIPTS (1997–2008), available online in Lexis Library. 
37 Criminal Atempts Act 1981, c. 47 § 1(1) (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
38 See [1998] CRIM. L. R. 876 (opinion of Wright, J.). 
39 This is a  preliminary  plea in  bar  of trial  on the  ground that the indictment  or complaint 
revealed no crime known to the law of Scotland. 
40 The Solicitor General is the second most senior Law Oficer in Scotland, the most senior 
being the  Lord  Advocate.  The  Law  Oficers rarely appear in  person in court, indicating that this 
appeal was regarded as one of considerable importance to the prosecution. 
41 The editor of The Criminal Law of Scotland reached the same conclusion: “Given what the 
accused was aleged to have done in the premises . . . it was impossible to conclude on any plausible 
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There is  no  dispute that  what the [accused] is said to  have  done,  by 
breaking into the flat and  doing the  various things  which he is said to 
have done there, constituted a breach of the peace.42 
 
IV. BREACH OF THE PEACE 
 
Unlike many countries, including Canada and England, where breaching the 
peace  gives the  police  power to effect an arest  but is  not a crime  per se, in 
Scotland, breach of the peace is a crime in its own right.43  Typicaly, the charge 
aleges that, “you, [name of accused] did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner, 
did [shout and swear/chalenge others to fight, etc.] and did commit a breach of the 
peace.”  It is,  however, notoriously  vague.  In the leading case  of Smith v. 
Donnely,44 the High Court defined breach of the peace as being commited when 
conduct is “severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people and threaten serious 
disturbance to the community.”45  This  definition is far from satisfactory:  what 
does it mean for conduct to be “severe”? What is meant by the “ordinary person”? 
In practice, the need for severe conduct means litle more than that it must not be 
conduct of an extremely trivial nature, and the “ordinary” person is equated to the 
hypothetical “reasonable  person.”   Where,  however, the accused’s  behavior is 
deemed  by the court to  be sufficiently flagrant,  no  members  of the  public  need 
have  been  disturbed, and indeed  none  need actualy to have  been  present; it is 
sufficient that the court takes the view that the behavior would have caused serious 
disturbance if members of the community had in fact been present. 
The range of behaviors to which this one crime has ben applied is very broad 
indeed and includes, inter alia, such  diverse types  of conduct as fighting;46 
shouting and swearing;47 abusing solvents;48 discharging a firearm;49 threatening 
                                                                          
theory that the stage  of atempted rape  had  been reached.” GORDON, supra note  12, at  6.10.  For a 
critique of the Forbes case, see PAMELA R. FERGUSON & CLAIRE MCDIARMID, SCOTS CRIMINAL LAW: 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS ¶¶ 12.11.2–12.11.3 (2009). 
42 H. M. Advocate v. Forbes, (1994) J.C. 71, 75–76 (Scot.) (opinion of Lord Justice-General 
Hope). 
43 In respect  of  Canadian law, see Jackie  Esmonde, The  Policing  of  Dissent:  The  Use  of 
Breach  of the  Peace  Arrests  at  Political  Demonstrations, 1 J.L.  & EQUALITY 246 (2002).  For a 
discussion on English law, see Glanvile L. Wiliams, Arrest for Breach of the Peace, CRIM. L. REV. 
578 (1954). 
44 Smith v. Donnely, (2002) J.C. 65 (Scot.). 
45 Id. at 71. 
46 Donnely v. H. M. Advocate, (2007) HCJAC 59 (Scot.). Numerous cases could be cited for 
each example on this list, but one case has been chosen in each respect to serve as an ilustration. For 
further discussion, see FERGUSON & MCDIARMID, supra note 41. 
47 Hunter v. Cotam, (2011) S.C.C.R. 130 (Scot.). 
48 Taylor v. Hamilton, (1984) S.C.C.R. 393 (Scot.). 
49 H. M. Advocate v. McGovern, (2007) HCJAC 21 (Scot.). 
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or atempting to commit suicide;50 throwing a lit firework in a bus;51 aggressively 
begging for  money;52 indecent exposure;53 and  making threatening  phone cals.54 
Although the facts aleged in Forbes were held to constitute a breach of the peace, 
the court also held that the averment that this was done “with intent to assault and 
rape” had to be deleted from the charge: 
 
[T]he effect of [the accused’s] conduct must be judged by what he did or 
by what he said, not by reference to his state of mind or his intention or 
to things that he has not yet done. The concluding words of this charge 
refer to acts  which the respondent  had  not  yet commited  but  was 
intending to commit . . . . In our opinion these words have no place in a 
charge of breach of the peace . . . .55 
 
The case was remited back to the Sherif Court so that the prosecution could 
amend the charge to  breach  of the  peace,  under  deletion  of the reference to the 
accused’s intentions.  
It is apparent that this is a very useful crime for a prosecutor, though it raises 
human rights and “fair labeling” issues.56 Its relevance to the Herzog scenario is 
that  breach  of the  peace has  been prosecuted  where the accused  had  not reached 
the stage of atempting to commit a different crime. As in Forbes, such cases often 
involve sexual misconduct. In Kearney v. Ramage,57 the charge aleged: 
 
[Y]ou . . . did conduct  yourself in a  disorderly  manner approach [two 
girls  who suffered from learning  dificulties and atended a special 
school] seize [one complainer]  by the  hand, refuse to release  her  hand, 
uter sexualy explicit comments, invite [them] to atend at a house with 
you, place them in a state of fear and alarm and commit a breach of the 
peace.58 
 
                                                                          
50 Torbet v. H. M. Advocate, (1998) S.C.C.R. 546 (Scot.). 
51 McLean v. McNaughton, (1984) S.C.C.R. 319 (Scot.). 
52 Wyness v. Lockhart, (1992) S.C.C.R. 808 (Scot.). Note that this requires to be done in an a 
fashion which is liable to cause alarm; begging is not a breach of the peace, as such. See Donaldson 
v. Vannet, (1998) S.L.T. 957 (Scot.).  
53 Heatheral v. McGowan, (2012) HCJAC 25 (Scot.). 
54 Robertson v. Vannet, (1999) S.L.T. 1081 (Scot.). 
55 H. M. Advocate v. Forbes, (1994) J.C. 71, 76 (Scot.) (opinion of Lord Hope). 
56 Article  7  of the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  has  been interpreted to require 
crimes to be defined with precision. 
57  (2007) S.C.C.R. 35. (Scot.). 
58 Id. at 36. 
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Likewise, in LBM v. H. M. Advocate59 the appelant pleaded guilty to a breach 
of the peace, in which the indictment stated that he engaged two school girls aged 
ten and eleven in conversation, asked them if he could tickle their legs, atempted 
to entice them into a car, and placed them in a state of fear and alarm.60 Since the 
list of conduct which may constitute a “substantial step” in § 5.01(2) of the MPC 
includes “enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go 
to the  place contemplated for its commission,” it seems that  had these cases 
occured in states  which  have adopted the  MPC, the accused could  have  been 
charged  with an atempted crime (presumably atempted sexual assault).  In 
Scotland, since  neither Kearney  nor  LBM had  progressed from  preparing to 
commit sexual assault to actualy  perpetrating that assault, the  only charge that 
could be prosecuted was breach of the peace. 
Charging breach of the peace for behaviors that might in other jurisdictions be 
characterized as an atempted offense against the  person has not always  been a 
successful strategy for the Scotish prosecution. In H. M. Advocate v. Greig61 the 
charge narrated: 
 
[H]aving  been  placed  on the sex  offenders register for life . . . for 
offences of lewd and libidinous practices62 against young children, [you] 
did conduct yourself in a disorderly manner and knowing that there was 
likely to be a large number of children at a fireworks display there, dress 
yourself in such a manner as to be easily mistaken for a steward or first 
aid oficer,  position  yourself adjacent to al the  public facilities there, 
place a police oficer who was in atendance at said event, to whom you 
are known and who was aware of the conviction aforesaid, in a state of 
fear and alarm for the safety of children and the public and did commit 
a breach of the peace.63  
 
A plea to the relevancy  of the charge64 was  upheld  by the trial judge,  who 
noted: 
 
Going to a fireworks  display in a  public park,  dressing  oneself in a 
manner as to  be easily  mistaken for a steward  or first aid  oficer and 
standing near the toilets, which seems to me to be the specification of the 
                                                                          
59  (2011) HCJAC 96 (Scot.). The appeal related to the sentence only. 
60 See  also Jude  v.  H. M.  Advocate, (2012) HCJAC 65 (Scot.).  As  wel as six charges  of 
sexual assault, the appelant was also charged with breach of the peace for having hidden a camera in 
the victim’s bathroom with a view to taking indecent photographs of her.  In the event, his plea to not 
guilty on this charge was accepted by the prosecution during the trial. 
61  (2005) S.C.C.R. 465 (Scot.). 
62 These are common law crimes in Scotland.  
63 Id. at 466. 
64 See, supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
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overt conduct said to comprise this breach of the peace, does not in my 
opinion meet the requirements of being ‘flagrant’ on the hypothesis that, 
apart from the  police  officer  with  his special  knowledge,  no  ordinary 
reasonable person was actualy alarmed, nor does it appear to me to be 
conduct  which  presents as  genuinely alarming and  disturbing in its 
context to any reasonable  person, if  one excludes from that reasonable 
person the  background  knowledge  possessed  by the  particular  police 
officer.65 
 
The prosecution abandoned its appeal in that case, but, in H. M. Advocate v. 
Murray,66 it again libeled a breach  of the  peace, which included reference to a 
previous conviction: 
 
[H]aving been convicted after trial on a charge of assault to severe injury 
and  danger  of life,  having assaulted a  13-year-old  boy  by striking  him 
with a  hammer and  burying  him in a shalow  grave and  having  been 
sentenced to eight years detention in a young offender's institute [sic]67 . . 
. [you did] . . . conduct yourself in a disorderly manner, state to [a social 
worker] . . . that you had been recently in possession of a hammer while 
behaving in a manner which may lead police oficers to search you and 
with the intention  of assaulting said  police  officers  with said  hammer, 
display a hammer to him and thereafter threaten to sexualy assault and 
murder a child, further state that  while in an area in  Falkirk to the 
prosecutor  unknown,  you  had seen a  boy  of  11–12  years  whom  you 
considered to  be a  possible  victim and that said crime  would  be 
commited at a  distance from  your  home, that  you  would dig the  grave 
deep and in  doing this  you  would avoid  detection and  prosecution for 
said crime and you did place said [social worker] in a state of fear and 
alarm for the safety  of the lieges and  you  did commit a breach  of the 
peace.68 
 
A second charge was in broadly similar terms.  The sheriff upheld a chalenge 
to these charges  on the  basis that they  breached statutory  prohibitions  on an 
accused  person’s  previous convictions  being revealed prior to trial.69  It is 
apparent, therefore, that there are limits on the extent to which breach of the peace 
can  be charged as an alternative to a crime  of atempted sexual assault.  
Nevertheless, it has proved a useful crime for the prosecution in cases in which the 
                                                                          
65 H. M. Advocate v. Greig, (2005) S.C.C.R. 465, 471–72 (Scot.). 
66 H. M. Advocate v. Murray, (2007) S.C.C.R. 271 (Scot.). 
67 The corect term is “young ofender institution.” 
68 Murray, (2007) S.C.C.R. at 272.  
69 This is prohibited by the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, § 101. 
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accused is stil at the stage of preparing to commit sexual assault but has not taken 
sufficient steps to be said to have been perpetrating the crime. It wil be recaled 
that in the Herzog scenario, commentators were asked to assume that a neighbor 
saw Herzog in the  bushes and reported this to his ex-wife.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the neighbor would be alarmed or disturbed by this behavior; even if 
this  was  not the case, the ex-wife  was certainly alarmed/disturbed since she 
reported the  mater to the  police.  In such circumstances, although a  Scotish 
Herzog could  not be charged with atempted  murder,  or any  other atempted 
offense against the person, he would likely be prosecuted for breach of the peace. 
 
V. A CRITIQUE 
 
Reflecting on the Herzog commentaries has led me to question whether this is 
a satisfactory state of afairs so far as Scots law is concerned.  I sometimes pose 
my own hypothetical to my criminal law students: 
 
Suppose that  on  Monday A makes the  decision to  murder B later that 
week.  On  Tuesday, A buys a  gun, and  on  Wednesday she  buys 
ammunition.   On Thursday she stakes out the  victim’s  house and  notes 
his routine.  At 3.30 p.m. on Friday, A sees her target  walking  his  dog. 
At  3.40  p.m. A takes  out the  gun.   She loads it at  3.45  p.m., and aims 
carefuly at the victim. At 3.47 p.m. she fires the gun. At what stage is A 
guilty  of atempted  murder?  . . . Should A be charged  with atempted 
murder the moment she gets into her car? Or when she sees the victim? 
When she takes out the gun?  Or when she loads it?  Does she atempt 
murder when she aims the loaded gun at the victim? Or do we need to 
go one step further and say that it is not atempted murder until A puls 
the trigger?70 
 
The English case of R. v. Jones71 involved a similar scenario. Jones intended 
to murder his victim so he purchased a shotgun, shortened its barel, and planned 
to escape to  Spain folowing the  kiling.  He took the  gun and some  Spanish 
currency and put on a disguise.  He lay in wait for his victim, who was driving a 
car.  Jones waited until the car stopped then jumped into the backseat and pointed 
the  gun at the  victim.  The  victim  managed to  grab the  gun and to escape.  
Convicted of atempted murder, Jones appealed on the basis that since it had not 
been established that the gun’s safety catch was off, or that his finger had been on 
the trigger, it  had  not  been  proven that  he  had atempted to commit  murder. 
Dismissing his appeal, the court stated: 
 
                                                                          
70 See also FERGUSON & MCDIARMID, supra note 41, at ¶ 8.2.3. 
71 [1990]  1  W.L.R.  1057 (Eng.).  For a critique  of this case, see Glanvile  Wiliams, Wrong 
Turnings on the Law of Atempts, CRIM. L. REV. 416, 418 (1991). This is discussed further, below. 
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Clearly his actions in obtaining the gun, in shortening it, in loading it, in 
puting on his disguise, and in going to the school could only be regarded 
as preparatory acts. But, in our judgment, once he had got into the car, 
taken out the loaded gun and pointed it at the victim with the intention of 
kiling  him, there  was suficient evidence for the consideration  of the 
jury . . . . It was a mater for them to decide whether they were sure those 
acts were more than merely preparatory.72 
 
In relation to my scenario, if asked to suggest when A ought to be regarded as 
having atempted to  kil  her  victim, the  majority  of students  plump for  when the 
gun is loaded,  or aimed at the  victim,  or  when it is actualy fired.  However, a 
smal minority see litle problem in opting for an earlier point, in some cases as far 
back as Tuesday—after al, they argue, we are told that A has decided to murder 
someone, and on Tuesday she begins to implement her plan.  They recognize the 
practical problems involved in the prosecution regarding being able to prove what 
A had decided at this early stage. But what if A confides to a friend, “I’ve finaly 
decided.  I’m going to kil B this week”? If we can prove that A resolved to kil 
and did something in furtherance of that resolve, then for some students A should 
be regarded as guilty of atempted murder at that point. For most people, however, 
this does not seem just.  As Professor Wiliam Wilson has argued: 
 
Penal  policy  must in such cases  be able to reconcile its retributive and 
preventative functions. Clearly it is better for harm to be prevented but 
there  must  nevertheless  be a critical  point  before  which  official 
intervention is discounted to reflect the law’s overiding commitment to 
freedom and autonomy, displayed in such features as the presumption of 
innocence and the act requirement.  The  overiding concern  here, 
therefore, is to devise a secure benchmark for when the criminal atempt 
actualy begins.73 
 
Thus, it is important that a legal system  does  not  hold a  person liable for 
atempting a crime at too early a stage.  
It  may  be argued that the  Scotish common law  breach  of the  peace  has 
proved to be a flexible and useful crime; it makes it likely that people like Herzog 
are convicted in circumstances where they have acted in a wrongful and potentialy 
harmful manner.  It would be ridiculous if a police officer who spoted him lurking 
in the bushes had to wait until he actualy pointed the gun at one of his intended 
victims—or worse stil, actualy fired the  gun—before  being able to intervene.  
Breach of the peace alows the accused to be arested, prosecuted, convicted and 
punished for contravening the law, at an early stage in the commission of a crime. 
On the  other  hand, it may be argued that this approach fails to correctly identify 
                                                                          
72 R v. Jones, [1990] 1 W.L.R. at 1062–63. 
73  WILLIAM WILSON, CENTRAL ISSUES IN CRIMINAL THEORY 231 (2002). 
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what it is that the accused has done which is reprehensible.  The wrongful behavior 
in Forbes, Ramage, LBM, Greig, or Murray is not primarily that it caused or was 
likely to cause a “disturbance to the community” or a “public disorder,” which is 
of the essence of the crime of breach of the peace. 
Professor Glanvile  Wiliams recommended several  years ago that  English 
Law should adopt the “substantial step” test of the MPC.74 In respect to the Jones 
case,  Wiliams questioned why lying in  wait for  one’s  victim,  or even earlier 
conduct such as  buying the shotgun  or shortening it, is regarded  by the law as 
insufficient to form the actus reus for an atempted  murder if there is suficient 
evidence  of intention to  kil.  Reflecting  on the Herzog scenario, I suggest that 
Scots law ought to  do likewise.75   Forbes’ aleged  behavior  merits condemnation 
and punishment  because he  not only intended to commit rape,  but also took 
substantial steps towards fulfiling this intention.  Similarly in Kearney v. Ramage 
and LBM, it is  what the accused intended to  do in each  of these cases  had  he 
succeeded in  persuading these  young  girls to accompany  him,  which constitutes 
the wrongful behavior which we condemn.  The reason our blood runs cold when 
reading the indictment in Greig has litle to do with the averment that the accused 
atended a firework display dressed as a first aid officer, and everything to do with 
the fact that the accused  was a  known  pedophile and the circumstances libeled 
strongly suggest that this act  of  deception  was an important step in his plan to 
sexualy assault a child.  We  may  be somewhat concerned  by the alegation in 
Murray that the accused caused alarm and upset to his social workers, but we are 
much more concerned that a man who had seriously injured a child in the past was, 
by  his  own admission,  planning to commit a similar ofense in the  near future. 
Whether Murray should  be convicted  of atempted  murder should  depend  on 
whether there  was evidence that he  had taken a substantial step towards 
commission  of this crime.  Revealing  his  plans to social  workers may  not  be 
sufficient, but evidence that he had indeed identified a potential victim could wel 
be enough  here.  That the substantial steps taken by an accused fel short  of the 
completed crime should  be a factor in  determining the appropriate sentence,  but 
ought not prevent conviction for a criminal atempt. Amendment of Scots law to 
redefine atempted crimes in this way would obviate the need for the prosecution 
to expand  breach  of the  peace  beyond its legitimate  boundaries as an essentialy 
public order crime. 
                                                                          
74 Wiliams, supra note 71, at 420–22. 
75 This  ought to  be coupled  with alowing “abandonment” to  mitigate sentence; further 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the curent paper. 
